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THE COURTROOM. By Roger W Shuy. Blackwell 1993. Pp. 205.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1909, Hugo Muensterberg published his pioneering treatise
on the psychology of witnessing, On The Witness Stand. He was
greeted by John Henry Wigmore (in other contexts, no enemy of
innovation) with a friendly wariness that has characterized the legal
system's response to social science evidence ever since. Wigmore
thought that Muensterberg's findings were interesting, but not sufficiently developed to be of use to the courts.' Still, when the psychologists were ready for the courts, Wigmore announced, the
courts would be ready for the psychologists. 2 Subsequent events
have cast more than a little doubt on that assertion.
While the courts have been quick to recognize the value of the
physical and medical sciences in resolving forensic disputes, the various branches of psychology, and social sciences in general, have
faced a comparatively chilly reception.3 Perhaps that is unavoidable.
The social scientist's knowledge is statistical and probablistic; the
courts' task is clinical and diagnostic. The scientist can report
whether a particular result is produced in ninety percent of experiments, but the courts must still decide whether this case is one of the
* Deputy Chief Counsel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, Boston, Massachusetts. B.A. 1972, Trinity College; J.D. 1975, Northwestern University School of Law;
LL.M 1979, Georgetown University Law Center.
I John Henry Wigmore, ProfessorMuensterbeqg and the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL. L.
REv. 399 (1909).
2 Id. at 404.
3 See generally Lauren Walker &John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A Ne\w Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559 (1987); Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Concerning
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony ConcerningSocial Frameworks Evidence, 52 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 85 (1989).
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ninety percent, or one of the ten percent. For this reason alone, the
translation of the social scientist's knowledge into the trial process
can never be automatic or easy. Besides, perhaps even more than
other evidence, the social scientist is subject to the distorting vagaries of adversary practice. No one is more convinced of this than
scientists themselves, substantial numbers of whom view lawyers,
courts, and their machinations with undisguised horror. 4 The social
scientists and the courts clearly realize that they cannot live comfortably together, but at the same time, they are manifestly unwilling to
live entirely apart.
Roger Shuy's book, Language and Crimes: The Use and Abuse of
Language Evidence in the Courtroom,5 is the account-lucid, balanced,
and laudably free of jargon-of one social scientist's efforts to offer
his knowledge to the legal system. It is a valuable document in the
problematic history of the forensic use of social science learning.
Shuy, a linguist, has consulted in over 200 criminal and civil cases
and has testified in thirty-five of them. His interest is in crimes such
as threats, bribery, extortion, or solicitation, which can be
6
"[a]ccomplished through language, not through physical acts." It
might seem to lawyers that Shuy oversimplifies when he asserts that
"[i]f one solicits or requests certain things ... one is committing a
crime through language alone."' 7 For example, in the cases in which
Shuy analyzes wiretap transcripts or videotaped sting operations,
language (usually conversation) is not used "alone" but as an indication of meaning or intent. Shuy, however, means more by "language" than "words." Indeed, what the linguist brings to the courts
is the recognition that, in assessing allegations of "language crime,"
context is as important as content:
Not only must jurors consider the words that were said, for example,
in a tape-recorded conversation that is used as evidence in a criminal
case, but also they must consider the context in which these words
were said, the several possible meanings provided by imperfect, inexplicit, vague word
selection, the social roles of participants, and many
8
other factors.
In Language Crimes, Shuy analyzes in detail a number of cases in
which he attempted to bring this truth home to the courts. Several
of his examples-the "Abscam" corruption case of Senator Harri4 See, e.g., Michael McCloskey et al., The Experimental Psychologist in Court: The Ethics of
Expert Testimony, 10 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1986).
5 ROGER W. SHUY, LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE
IN THE COURTROOM
6 Id. at 1.

Id.
8 Id. at 2.
7

(1992).
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son Williams 9 and theJohn DeLorean drug prosecution 0-are
brated, but all are illuminating.
II.

241
cele-

SEEING AND HEARING

For lawyers, Shuy's experiences will immediately evoke the familiar and protracted controversy over expert psychological testimony concerning the frailties of eyewitness identifications.
Identification can be skewed by a variety of surprising factors, including stress, expectation, and social pressures, among many
others. 1 ' While the differences between expert testimony about
seeing and about hearing are at least as interesting as the similarities, the similarities are real enough, and provide a convenient place
to begin. In each instance, the social sciences apparently have uncovered misconceptions about everyday life that can fatally distort
jury fact finding.
A jury arrives at its conclusions by utilizing both specific data
and general propositions. Where, for example, there is evidence of
the specific fact that blood is found on the defendant's knife, the
jurors can be counted on to apply the general proposition that if
there is blood on the knife, that tends to prove battery. This general
proposition is supplied by the jurors' everyday experiences. But
what if the jurors harbor a mistaken general proposition? What if
they believe, for example, that an eyewitness' confidence is a reliable
indicator of the eyewitness' accuracy? In such a situation, some psychologists argue, the ordinary adversary process generates the specific piece of data, that is, eyewitness confidence. By doing so,
however, the process impedes accurate factfinding, because the jurors will apply a general proposition which is simply wrong, such as
the assertion that confidence proves accuracy. 12
At the core of Shuy's book is a catalogue of mistaken general
conceptions about language that are likely to be applied to taped or
videotaped crimes. First, Shuy identifies three misconceptions
about the defendants who appear on tape:
1. if they are on the tape at all, they must be guilty of something;...
2. [i]f they are guilty of one of the charges, they are probably guilty
of the other charges as well[; and]
3. [t]he defendants hear, understand, and remember everything said
9 Id. at 20-35.
10 Id. at 68-85.

11 For a survey, see James M. Doyle, Legal Issues in Eyewitness Evidence, in PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE (David C. Raskin ed., 1989).
12 See Gary Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implicationsfor
Triers of Fact, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981).
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by the [undercover] agent or other [participant to] the conversation. 13
Trial lawyers will find Shuy's first two contributions less than astounding, but with the third, Shuy enters onto his own territory, and
begins to suggest how much a linguist can add to our understanding
of apparently cut-and-dried transactions.
Shuy provides examples when he identifies five misconceptions
about language:
1. Meaning is found primarily in individual words.
2. Listening to a tape once will be enough to determine its content.
3. Reading a transcript of a tape is as good as hearing the tape itself.
Transcripts are accurate and they convey everything that is on the
tape.
4. All people understand the same things by
their words.
4
5. People say what they mean and intend.'
The potential impact of these misconceptions is easy enough to see,
and no one claims that Shuy is a charlatan or a quack. So, why
would a trial court object to his testifying in correction of these misconceptions? Why would an appellate court uphold trial court exclusions? There are a number of answers, but the fundamental
problem for a court examining Shuy's list of misconceptions is the
fact that each of the statements could be saved by adding "sometimes," and not one of them could be quite corrected by adding
"never." Sometimes, people do say what they mean and intend. It is
not true that transcripts are never sufficiently correct. Shuy's probablistic explications of the correct conceptions of language can never
quite complete the courts' diagnostic task of deciding what was
meant or intended by the statements at issue in a particular case.
Understanding or even agreeing with Shuy's points only takes the
courts so far. From the legal system's point of view, there is still the
problem of how Shuy's information will be used. Will the expert's
credentials overwhelm the jury? Will the expert's bill bankrupt the
courts? As with testimony about eyewitness performance, "human
factors," and other social science research findings about normal,
everyday life, the resolution of these questions falls on the trial
courts. 15
III.

TRIAL COURT'S SYSTEMIC WORRIES

Professor G. Robert Blakey's helpful Foreword to Shuy's book
13 SnuY, supra note 5, at 3.
14 Id. at 8-19.
15 See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) ("The trial judge has
broad discretion in the matter of admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his
action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous.").
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rightly underscores the futility of looking to appellate opinions for
16
an understanding of the general course of trial court practice.
There are a number of appellate court opinions upholding the exclusion of Professor Shuy's testimony, 17 but they say only that the
trial court was not obligated to admit Shuy's opinions, not that the
court was, or a future court should feel, forbidden to admit them.
The abuse of discretion standard, which governs appellate review of
evidentiary rulings, provides some comfort to a trial judge worried
about appellate reversal of his or her mistakes, but it also deprives
the trial judge of guidance that might help avoid the mistake in the
first place.' Within the generous scope of the abuse of discretion
standard, how do trial judges decide whether to admit or exclude
evidence such as Shuy's? One of the virtues of Shuy's book is the
light it sheds on judges' reactions to the information Shuy offers.
To begin with, Language Crimes hints at constraints arising from
outside the boundaries of a particular case, which are felt by trial
judges, but seldom draw explicit mention in appellate opinions.
For example, a trial judge asked to rule on the admissibility of
expert linguistics testimony cannot fail to see that her ruling will be
perceived not only as admitting a particular piece of proof, but also
as endorsing the opening of an entire newfield of testimony. This
recognition naturally engenders caution, not because judges believe
that linguists (in contrast to, for example, polygraph experts) are
peddling an unreliable new science but because of the potential system-wide impact of the decision.
Shuy's teachings share one feature with those offered by psychologists specializing in eyewitness reliability: both focus on what
is normal, expected and typical. Linguists and experimental psychologists testify about how language ordinarily operates, or how
witnesses ordinarily remember. This fact distinguishes offers of expert proof in the two fields from earlier, successful offers of psychological and social science proof-offers which focused, for example,
on explaining to jurors the difficulties in perception, memory and
expression associated with drugs or alcohol, 19 or organic brain damage. 20 Putting aside for a moment the debate over whether "nor16 G. Robert Blakey, Foreword to SHUY, supra note 5, at vi-xiv.

17 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790 (1 1th Cir. 1990), aft'don other grounds,
112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992); United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Schmidt, 711 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1983).
18 James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About
Trial Court Analysis of the PrdudicialEffects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619, 628-40 (1984).

19 See, e.g., Fries v. Berberich, 177 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. 1974).

20
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mal" translates into "understood by jurors," one thing "normal"
clearly does mean to a trial judge in this context is "frequent." To
admit expert testimony every time an eyewitness testifies or a wiretap is admitted would impose enormous costs on the legal system.
From the perspective of the trial courts, it appears inevitable that
these costs will be multiplied as a counter-expert inexorably follows
the first one, 2 1 the docket slows to a crawl, nothing is concluded,
and the case backlog burgeons.
It may be that the trial courts have been particularly sensitive to
these dangers because Shuy's testimony, like the critiques of eyewitness performance, threatens to destabilize a portion of their
caseload which might once have been thought to be pretty well
under control. In the routine of the criminal courts, a case based on
an eyewitness was a good bet to draw a quick guilty plea rather than
a slow trial. At least before linguistic analysis showed defendants a
ray of hope, cases with a videotaped "sting" were even less likely to
go to trial. Videotaped stings, such as the DeLorean case, are less
frequent than eyewitness street robbery cases, but their trial costs
are not trivial. When investigators utilize undercover videotapes,
they do so in expensive, highly visible prosecutions, and invest a
substantial commitment of law enforcement's financial and moral
resources. When a DeLorean is acquitted, continuing legal education programs explaining the virtues of linguistics evidence multiply
instantly, and suddenly defendants, who once immediately pleaded
guilty when confronted with their own indiscreet, wiretapped conversations, start to demand trials rather than admitting the error of
their ways.
The essence of Shuy's helpfulness for a videotaped defendant is
his capacity to generate alternative hypotheses about the meaning of
the videotaped transaction. Was the defendant agreeing to a conspiracy, or was he just being polite?2 2 Was that actually an attempt
at bribery, or was it an offer of a legitimate contribution? 2 3 By focusing the tools of linguistic analysis on the subject of conversation,
Shuy (as he demonstrates repeatedly in Language Crimes) can identify
numerous innocent explanations for speech that seems guilty.
Shuy's participation in the defense of NewJersey Senator Harrison A. Williams provides an example. Beginning in 1978, the FBI
labored for fifteen months to catch Williams committing a crime on
21 See, e.g., State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1227 (Ariz. 1983) (Hays,J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
22 SHUY, supra note 5, at 66-96.
23 Id. at 43-51.
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tape. 24 Eventually, FBI agents, impersonating representatives of the
imaginary Abdul Enterprises, made a final effort to generate a statement by" Williams indicating that Williams wanted his shares in a
titanium mine hidden. 2 5 An FBI agent, posing as a sheik, approached Williams and asked for special legislation to permit the
sheik to establish permanent residence in the United States. A bribe
of $25,000 to $50,000 was proposed. A similar scheme had already
resulted in the conviction of a number of New Jersey politicians.
Shuy's analysis of the videotaped encounter is too intricate to describe fully here without unfair oversimplification, but his approach
can be summarized.
Shuy first describes the structure of a typical "bribe event" and
compares the Williams tape to it.26 A "bribe event" involves elements present in the Williams tape: the statement of a problem
(i.e., "I need immigration help") and a proposal ("I'll give you
money for legislation"). A "bribe event," however, also requires a
completion phase. In his analysis of the Williams conversations,
Shuy draws from a variety of disciplines to demonstrate convincingly that the completion phase never arrived. In his discussion, for
example, he explains why the phrase "government contracts" could
easily have been misunderstood as "government contacts" by referring to the FBI agent's Eastern American dialect. 2 7 Shuy argues cogently that the dialogue between Williams and the "sheik" cannot
be understood without remembering the social psychological aspects of a conversation between political leaders from different cultures. 28 Even readers who doubt Shuy's conclusion that Senator
Williams was not accepting a bribe but politely brushing one off will
have to concede that the Williams tapes have become a much richer
source of information due to Shuy's explication.
There is a law-enforcement version of Shuy's testimony: police
officers frequently offer expert assertions of guilty explanations for
speech that seems innocent.29 Where the "innocent eyes" of jurors
might see nothing sinister in a conversation or chain of events, lawenforcement experts on organized crime, drug dealing, or loansharking are routinely permitted to explain the meaning of "coded"
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
26 Id. at 24, 33.
27 Id. at 30-3 1.
28 Id. at 32.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211, 232-34 (3d Cir. 1990) ("coded"
loansharking terms).
24

25
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conversations or deceptive schemes. 30 The comparative ease with
which this inculpatory expertise is admitted fuels the suspicion that
Shuy, like the eyewitness' critics, is unwelcome in some courts because he testifies on the wrong side.
IV.

ONE CASE AT A TIME

Even if these general worries concerning linguistics testimony
were to evaporate, however, specific offers in specific cases would
still require evaluation. Again, reference to the eyewitness experience helps to focus the discussion. In this discussion, the differences between the eyewitness problem and the linguistics problem
are more helpful than the similarities.
Courts upholding the exclusion of valid scientific testimony
have generally employed two broad rationales, often in combination. The first is that the jurors will be so awed by the expert's
"aura" of expertise that they will surrender the case to the expert,
rather than exercise their ownjudgment. 3 ' The second rationale is
that the expert testimony represents an expensive and burdensome
solution to a problem that does not exist, either because the jurors
already understand the witness' information 32 or because the standard tools of adversary presentation allow counsel to convey the
thoughts behind the expert's testimony without resorting to the expert. 33 In short, novel science evidence is subjected to the traditional probative value/prejudicial effect analysis that forms the
foundation of most evidentiary decisions.
A consensus may be forming in the long debate over the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony concerning a procedure for
dealing with the probative/prejudicial problem in that context.
Courts favoring the admission of expert testimony on the psychology of eyewitness identification have sought to confine the testimony's prejudicial effect by embargoing direct comment on the
eyewitness identification at issue, and confining the expert (and the
expert's "aura") to a general lecture on the psychology of eyewitness identification. 34 Language Crimes demonstrates very clearly
30 See generally Deon J. Nossel, Note: The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by
Law Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (1993).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (scientific or
expert testimony may create/cause danger of undue prejudice, confuse issues or mislead
jury due to "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness").
32 See, e.g., Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977); United States v. Fosher,
590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979).
33 See, e.g., Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153.
34 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). But see State v. Griffin,
626 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah 1981) (general lecture lacks probative force). For a discussion
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that this strategy cannot be adapted to the linguistics expert without
foregoing many of the most useful aspects of that expert's
testimony.
Shuy's accounts of his analysis of alleged "language crimes" do
contain consideration of probablistic, statistical findings that correct
general misconceptions. For example, in writing about the Harrison Williams "Abscam" investigation, Shuy makes a strong case for
the proposition that each of the participants to a conversation does
not necessarily understand the same thing about the meaning of the
language used. But the real significance of Shuy's contribution to
understanding the "Abscam" transactions lies not in this general
statement, but in his meticulous, rigorous, diagnostic examination of
the actual tapes at issue. 35 Unlike most experts, a linguist such as
Shuy can work carefully from the actual primary data.3 6 He listens
to a tape, or parts of it, "as many of 50 times," 37 then subjects it to
"rigorous linguistic tests of authenticity, tests that distinguish a
threat from a warning ...."38 Shuy states that "a linguist's hearing
may be no better than a juror's hearing, but the linguist's listening
skills are finely honed by training and experience." 39 To restrict a
linguist's testimony to recitation of general principles deprives the
jurors of the advantages of these enhanced listening skills.
Once a decision is made to embargo testimony about the specifics of a "language crime," there is very little point in having a linguist offer a lecture on general principles. To begin with, it is highly
unlikely that a linguist will be able to make himself understood without reference to the specific factors comprising the "speech event"
in issue.40 Besides, a number of the general propositions that a linguist would offer (e.g., the potential inaccuracy of transcripts) can
arguably be dealt with more efficiently-and, arguably, more authoritatively-injury instructions. 4 ' As is usual with relevancy decisions, there is no escape from rigorous, case-by-case analysis. The
various misconceptions about language will differ in their original
extent, differ in the readiness with which they will yield to conventional adversary attack, and differ in their importance in individual
of the strategic and tactical implications of these positions, see
JAMES DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,

ELIZABETH

LoFrus &

328-30 (2d ed. 1992).

35 SHUY, supra note 5, at 11.
36 Id. at 204-05.
37 Id. at 11.

38 Id. at 19.
39 Id. at xvii.
40 Id. at 12.
41 See, e.g., EDWARD DEVITr ET AL., FEDERALJURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS 442-46
(1992).
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cases. No uniform strategy for dealing with the expert witness
quandary emerges.
V.

OFF THE WITNESS STAND

Perhaps the principal attribute of Shuy's book is its resistance to
the legal community's endemic tendency to see all questions of social science information as questions of expert testimony. Throughout his narratives, Shuy provides examples of the value of teaching
lawyers about linguistics, independently of testimony. It is impossible to read Shuy's book without recognizing that even if no linguist
ever saw a courtroom, fact-finding in "language crime" cases would
be greatly enhanced if law enforcement agencies, advocates, and
courts absorbed the linguists' teachings. If law enforcement agencies conducted their "stings" with greater awareness of the complexity of "speech events," fewer ambiguous cases would result in
arrests. If prosecutors evaluated tapes with an eye to Shuy's teachings, fewer prosecutions would be pursued without a clearer understanding of whether a "language crime" had occurred or could be
proved. Certainly, if defense lawyers mastered the lessons that the
linguists are prepared to teach, the lawyers' investigations, pretrial
discovery, and cross-examination would all be far better aimed at
generating the exculpatory hypotheses that the jurors will require
before rejecting the superficially inculpatory evidence of a conversation or transaction. Finally, courts, simply by improving the procedures used by jurors in playing recordings, could eliminate many
likely errors.
Whether these actors will heed Shuy's call is, of course, questionable. One final, melancholy lesson to be drawn from the history
of the debate over the admissibility of psychological testimony regarding eyewitness identification is that the legal system's actors will
resist any effort to persuade them that the linguist is anything but a
nuisance hired by the other side, or a quick-fix for the problems encountered in their own cases. Still, Language Crimes makes the best
case imaginable for abandoning those responses to social science
information. In doing so, it is a welcome contribution.

